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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980271-CA 
vs. : 
JOLENE M WILBER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant, Jolene M. Wilber, appeals her conviction of communications fraud, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1998). This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering restitution where, despite 
intervening events, defendant's actions ultimately led to the victim's pecuniary loss? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court will not disturb an order of restitution unless the trial court 
exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. State v. Snvder. 747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 
1987); State v. Garcia. 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 
980 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 17, 1997, defendant Jolene M. Wilber was charged by information 
with two counts of communications fraud, both second degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (Supp. 1998) (R. 6). The information was later amended 
to change the second count to a third degree felony (id.). 
On February 2, 1998, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of communications 
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of section 76-10-1801(1) (R. 21-26). As part of 
her plea agreement, defendant acknowledged that she "may be ordered by the Court to 
make restitution to any victim(s) of [her] crimes" (R. 24). 
Following a restitution hearing on February 20,1998, defendant was ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of $21,600 to be split between the two victims in this case (R. 37, 
39-41). However, because defendant had already deposited $13,500 to the district court 
(R. 20, 39, 69:5), the court only ordered that defendant pay an additional $8100 in 
restitution (R. 37). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 42-43). This appeal ensued (R. 53-54). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 24, 1997, defendant assisted her mother, Darleen Leeper, in purchasing 
a used car from Tim Dahle Infinity ("Tim Dahle") for $21,995 (R. 69:7-8,10, 31-32,40). 
The car was purchased with a check drawn on the account of Matt Wilber, defendant's 
husband (R. 69:40). Although defendant and her mother were given possession of the car, 
Tim Dahle kept the title pending the check clearing on Matt Wilber*s account 
(R. 69:18-19). On May 30, 1997, Tim Dahle attempted to cash the check (R. 69:42). 
The check did not clear, and Tim Dahle never received payment for the car (R. 69:31-32). 
Tim Dahle continued to retain the title (R. 69:18). 
On June 3, 1997, defendant sold the car to Low Book Sales ("Low Book") for 
$13,500 (R. 22, 69:18). Defendant did not have the title, but represented to Low Book 
that the title would clear, even though she knew it would not (R. 22, 69:19). Low Book 
subsequently requested the title from Tim Dahle, but Tim Dahle refused to release it until 
the car was paid for (R. 69:19). 
In August 1997, the parties began to negotiate for the return of the car to Tim Dahle 
(R. 69:19). Tim Dahle proposed that defendant give Low Book $13,500 in exchange for 
the car and then return to the car to Tim Dahle (R. 69:19-20). However, this arrangement 
was contingent upon Tim Dahle's right to inspect the car before accepting return of it 
(R. 69:20). Low Book apparently agreed, but because it had resold the car, it had to 
recover the car before the deal could be completed (R. 69:20, 22-24). Additionally, 
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Low Book refused to permit Tim Dahle to inspect the car until Low Book had been repaid 
by defendant (R. 69:21, 33). 
On November 25, 1997, Tim Dahle finally retrieved the car by paying Low Book 
$5000 (R. 69:8, 23). Additionally, the car had suffered about $3200 in depreciation, and 
Tim Dahle expended $673.33 for repairs and $60 for detailing the car (R. 69:9-10). 
At defendant's restitution hearing, Tim Dahle1 s representative testified that 
Tim Dahle's expenses related to its recovery of the car were approximately $9000 
(R. 69:10,27). Tim Dahle's representative also testified that the depreciation was partially 
due to the number of miles the car had been driven from the time it was purchased from 
Tim Dahle until the time it was retrieved (R. 11-12, 14, 31). At the time of purchase from 
Tim Dahle, the car had about 74,000 miles on it (R. 69:11, 16, Defendant's Exhibit 2); 
at the time defendant sold the car to Low Book, it had about 74,700 miles on it 
(Defendant's Exhibit 3); and at the time Tim Dahle retrieved the car from Low Book, 
it had about 80,000 miles on it (R. 69:11, 34, State's Exhibit 1). At the conclusion of the 
restitution hearing, the district court decided that some of Tim Dahle's economic loss 
was attributable to Low Book, and therefore reduced the restitution award to from $9000 
to $8100 (R. 37, 69:50-52). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering 
her to pay restitution in the amount of $8100 to Tim Dahle. Specifically, she asserts that 
because Tim Dahle's pecuniary loss should be attributed to Low Book's actions, not her1 s, 
she should not be held liable for restitution to Tim Dahle. However, defendant's argument 
fails because her actions set in motion the very events that ultimately led to Tim Dahle's 
pecuniary loss. Accordingly, the district court's restitution order is entitled to affirmance 
on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY ORDERING RESTITUTION WHERE, 
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE INTERVENING EVENTS, 
DEFEND ANTS ACTIONS ULTIMATELY LED TO THE 
VICTIM'S PECUNIARY LOSS 
At the time of defendant's restitution hearing, Utah's restitution statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1997),l provided in pertinent part: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which defendant has agreed to 
make restitution as part of a plea agreement.. . . 
1
 In her brief on appeal, defendant cites to the 1998 version of Utah's restitution 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998), which did not become effective until 
May 4, 1998. However, inasmuch as defendant has not raised any arguments below or 
on appeal based on the recent changes in section 76-3-201, those arguments are waived. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997). Furthermore, because the language of 
that section is mandatory, the district court must order restitution unless it determines that 
restitution is inappropriate under the particular facts of the case before it. See State v. 
Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Snyder, 747 P.2d at 420), cert. 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
It is well settled that an order of restitution should not be disturbed on appeal unless 
the trial court exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 
866, 868 (Utah App. 1992); accord Snyder, 747 P.2d at 422; Garcia. 866 P.2d at 6; 
Robinson. 860 P.2d at 980. Moreover, an abuse of discretion will be found only if 
this Court determines that "fno reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the 
trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. 
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
Turning to the case at bar, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would take 
the view adopted by the district court here. At the end of the restitution hearing, the 
district court found: 
The restitution claim approximates $9,000. In looking 
at State's Exhibit No. 1, there is a breakdown of some of that 
and some of that is undisputed. It appears to me that the 
statute clearly does require that restitution that is ordered be 
attributable to the defendant's criminal behavior. There's not 
a bright line test for that and each case is fact sensitive. 
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In this particular case, I do have some concerns about 
the conduct of Low Book, because they certainly made-their 
actions seemed to have increased some of the damages here 
and but for that particular conduct, the economic loss to 
[Tim Dahle] would be less. And some of-clearly the 
defendant put into motion a series of events that resulted in a 
substantial loss to both victims. And I'm not critical- I don't 
mean to sound critical of either victim here except to the extent 
that Low Book resold the vehicle, and it was after that that 
the-so much of the additional mileage was put on the car 
before this ultimately was resolved. 
I'm not adjudicating anything, really, between 
[Tim Dahle] and Low Book. It seemed to me [Tim Dahle] 
did-took rather heroic measures to try to recover this car. 
And counsel-well, not counsel but the parties, [Tim Dahle] 
and Low Book, even had to retain counsel to negotiate all this 
as well as having people from each organization working on 
this as well. 
R. 69:49-50 (emphasis added). The district court additionally considered several other 
factors, including defendant's age and other abilities and the fact that defendant owed 
restitution in other cases, and concluded that she had the ability to pay restitution. See 
R. 69:51. The district court then adjusted the amount of restitution from $9000 to $8100 
based on the portion of Tim Dahle' s pecuniary damages that were attributable to 
Low Book's actions. See R. 69:51-52. 
In light of the above facts, the view adopted by the district court here is not 
unreasonable. First, by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty, defendant admitted that 
she aided her mother in fraudulently procuring the car from Tim Dahle with a check that 
bounced, and that she then turned around and sold it to Low Book, knowing that she did 
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not have the title and would not be able to get it. See R. 22. Thus, she does not dispute 
that she engaged in the behavior that ultimately led to Tim Dahle's pecuniary loss. 
Accordingly, the only question before the district court was not whether to order 
restitution, but how much restitution should be imposed. Here, Tim Dahle demonstrated 
that its losses were about $9000, and those figures have not been challenged by defendant 
below or on appeal. Rather, defendant challenges only whether she should be held liable 
for those amounts. However, because the amount of restitution ordered by the district 
court is less than the victim's losses, even considering Low Book's intervening actions, 
that figure is not unreasonable, and thus, cannot constitute an abuse of the broad discretion 
given to district courts in these matters. 
Moreover, this result directly follows from another restitution decision of this 
Court. In State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1997), the defendant challenged an order of restitution, claiming that the 
"intervening and superseding negligence of the police" relieved him of any liability for any 
loss suffered by the victim in that case. Id. at 541. This Court rejected the defendant's 
argument, specifically holding that the negligence of the police was not so unforeseeable 
as to supersede the fault of the defendant in causing the victim's loss. IdL at 544. The 
Court additionally held that but for appellant's criminal act, which resulted in the 
impoundment that created the opportunity for the police officers' error, the victim's loss 
would not have occurred. IdL 
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Similarly, in the case at bar, the damages that were suffered after Low Book sold 
the car were not so unforeseeable as to supercede defendant's fault in causing Tim Dahle's 
loss. In fact, inasmuch as Low Book is a used car dealer, it was readily foreseeable that 
once Low Book obtained possession of the car, it would try to sell it. Moreover, under 
a McBride analysis, it is clear that but for defendant's sale of the car to Low Book, which 
created the opportunity for Low Book's sale of the car, the damages due to the extra 
mileage put on the car would not have occurred. 
Thus, defendant's argument that Low Book's resale of the car solely caused 
Tim Dahle's pecuniary loss is meritless. It is beyond dispute that if defendant had not 
gained possession of the car from Tim Dahle and sold it to Low Book, no damages would 
have occurred. Defendant set in motion the very events that caused Tim Dahle's pecuniary 
loss. Accordingly, the proper measure of restitution ought to be Tim Dahle's damages 
from the date defendant and her mother drove it off Tim Dahle's lot until the date it was 
returned to that lot. Consequently, if anything, the district court was lenient in reducing 
defendant's restitution from $9000 to $8100. 
Furthermore, defendant's argument that Low Book should be held solely liable for 
Tim Dahle's pecuniary damages ignores the fact that the only additional damage found to 
be done to the car after defendant sold it to Low Book was the extra mileage. As testified 
to by Tim Dahle's representative at the restitution hearing, this only accounted for a small 
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portion of the $3200 in depreciation to the car.2 See R. 69:14, 31. In fact, there was 
conflicting testimony as to exactly how much it accounted for. Compare R.69:14 ($1450) 
with R. 69:31 ($700). Furthermore, defendant's analysis does not account for the $5000 
Tim Dahle had to pay to retrieve the car, nor the $673.33 for repairs, nor the $60 for 
detailing the car. These are pecuniary damages for which there is no evidence supporting 
defendant's claim that she should not be held liable for them. 
Lastly, defendant devotes several pages of her brief on appeal to Low Book's 
alleged "bad faith." Aplt. Brief at 11-13. First, this representation is contrary to the facts 
found by the district court below. The district court did not find bad faith on the part of 
Low Book and instead stated that it was not "critical of either victim here except to the 
extent that Low Book resold the vehicle." R. 69:50. In fact, defendant's bad faith 
argument is particularly specious in light of the fact that the district court praised both 
victims' efforts to resolve this matter. I<L Second, Low Book's alleged bad faith is simply 
irrelevant to the question of defendant's liability for restitution to Tim Dahle. As the 
district court correctly acknowledged, the purpose of the restitution hearing was not to 
adjudicate matters between Tim Dahle and Low Book, kL, but to determine defendant's 
liability for the pecuniary loss suffered by Tim Dahle. 
2
 Counsel on appeal represents that "Tim Dahle testified that the added mileage 
which resulted after Low Book sold the car was the single most significant depreciating 
factor." Aplt. Brief at 11. However, the record is directly to the contrary. See 
R.69:14, 31. 
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In summary, if this Court accepts defendant's argument, it must hold that 
Low Book's intervening actions essentially excused the actions undertaken by defendant, 
and therefore, independently caused Tim Dahle1 s pecuniary loss. Not only is such a result 
contrary to the facts of this case, it is untenable. This is especially true in light of the 
goals of restitution: (1) to make the victim of the crime whole again and (2) to remind a 
defendant of her wrongdoing and to require her to repay the costs society has incurred as 
a result of her misconduct. See State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695, 699 n.4 (Utah App. 
1997). Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant's argument on appeal and find that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution under the 
circumstances of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district court's order directing defendant to pay Tim Dahle Infinity $8100 in restitution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4 dav of January, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
NORMAN E. PLATE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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